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Wikileaks: Bouterse en Shaheed Roger Khan

Bouterse samen met Mendonca witwassen van drugs geld in Brazilie
Bouterse  drug connecties met Shaheed Khan Bron Wikileaks
Bouterse drug connecties met Shaheed Khan Bron Wikileaks

 

Viewing cable 06PARAMARIBO399, DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES

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Reference ID Created Classification Origin
06PARAMARIBO399 2006-06-23 18:39 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paramaribo

VZCZCXYZ0019

RR RUEHWEB

 

DE RUEHPO #0399/01 1741839

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 231839Z JUN 06

FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8477

INFO RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 2000

RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1554

S E C R E T PARAMARIBO 000399

 

SIPDIS

 

NOFORN

 

SIPDIS

 

DEPT FOR INR

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR-LUFTIG

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2016

TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PREL PGOV GY NS

SUBJECT: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES

(C-AL6-00586)

 

REF:  A. SECSTATE 92995

B. PARAMARIBO 039

C. PARAMARIBO 043

D. PARAMARIBO 285

E. 05 PARAMARIBO 751

F. PARAMARIBO 090

G. PARAMARIBO 135

 

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHA E. BARNES, REASONS 1.4 (b)

& (d).

 

Post presents response to reftel A.  In light of the recent

arrest of Shaheed “Roger” Khan, Post notes the state of

flux in relationship between Khan and Desi Bouterse.

 

1.  (S/NF)  WHAT IS THE STATUS OF DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED

“ROGER” KHAN’S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP?

 

Khan and Bouterse are partners in the drug trade, according

to sensitive sourcing.   The police suspect that Surinamese

citizen Steven Douglas, the owner of local fishing and

hunting store “Tacklebox”,” has served as the intermediary

between the two.

 

2.  (S/NF)  HOW AND THROUGH WHAT MEANS DOES KHAN SUPPORT

BOUTERSE?  WHAT CAN OR DOES BOUTERSE OFFER IN RETURN?

 

Khan is believed to help Bouterse’s financial situation by

giving him the means to supplement his income through

narcotics trafficking.  According to a senior Surinamese

law enforcement official, the dismantling of several

criminal rings by the GOS through seizures, arrests, and

convictions over the last two years hurt Bouterse

financially and forced him to reach out to new partners,

such as Khan.  According to the scenario outlined by the

Attorney General to the Ambassador in January, Khan had

planned to support Bouterse’s efforts to avoid jail time

via the creation of civil unrest and possible assassination

attempts. (See refs B and C).  It is not clear what

Bouterse can provide in return, but he likely offered Khan

access to Surinamese criminal elements and structures,

eased access to regular shipping to Europe for drug

movement, and protection while in Suriname.  Just after his

arrest, Khan engaged one of Suriname’s leading criminal

defense lawyers, Irwin Kanhai, who is also defending

Bouterse in the December 1982 murder trial.

 

3.  (S/NF) IS KHAN ACTIVE IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE, AND IF

SO, WHICH DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS DOES HE DEAL WITH?  DOES

HE MAINTAIN TIES TO ANY OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS, SUCH AS

TERRORIST OR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS?  WHAT FINANCES AND

TECHNICAL CAPABILITY DOES HE HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL?

 

As reported in INSCR, Khan is the head of a major drug

trafficking organization based in Guyana.  In this

capacity, he has dealt directly with Columbia drug cartels

and criminal groups in the U.S. and Suriname.  According to

Minister of Justice and Police Chan Santokhi, Khan has

conducted arms-for-drugs deals with FARC.

 

According to sensitive sourcing, Bouterse still has

connections to Eduardo Beltran, who is a major regional

narcotics logistics/transportation handler currently

operating out of Venezuela.  Beltran reportedly travels to

Suriname on a monthly basis.

 

At the time of Khan’s arrest, he was found with 33 cell

phones, 2 satellite phones, and a powerful laptop, which

would suggest technical sophistication. Embassy Georgetown

would be better able to address his financial situation.

 

4.  (S/NF) HOW OFTEN, AND WHERE, DOES BOUTERSE TRAVEL TO

GUYANA?  REF C INDICATES KHAN WAS LAST IN SURINAME IN

JANUARY 2006, BUT ANALYSTS WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON HOW

OFTEN HE TRAVELS TO SURINAME.

 

According to Bouterse’s public admission he travels to

Guyana on a regular basis, but “keeps his travels quiet so

as not to cause problems for friends.” (See ref D).  Over

the course of the past a year, Surinamese police know of

three separate occasions in which Bouterse went to Guyana.

The last known Bouterse trip to Guyana was the first week

of May.  Bouterse has also admitted to regular travel to

Brazil.

 

According to Minister Santokhi, Khan has traveled to

 

Suriname on a “regular basis” over the last year; police

know of two Khan visits to Paramaribo in the last year.

Police know that Khan has also visited Bouterse’s property

located near Wasjabo, a village that sits on the Corantijn

River not far from the town of Apoera on the Guyanese-

Surinamese border, but do not know of dates or times.  Out

of Washabo is likely where Bouterse crosses into Guyana, as

there are no border controls in the isolated location.

According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has also met

with Khan in the western town of Nickerie at a property

owned by NDP Parliamentarian Mohamed Rashied Doekhie.

 

 

5.  (S)  OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE, DO BOUTERSE OR KHAN

HAVE ANY PLANS TO CREATE CIVIL UNREST THROUGH PROPAGANDA,

RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL

LEADERS, OR STIRRING RACIAL OR SOCIOECONOMIC TENSIONS?

 

As the leader of Suriname’s largest single opposition party

(NDP), Bouterse takes full advantage of his well-organized

political apparatus to publicly harangue and provoke

government leaders through public speeches, protests, and

parliamentary antics, often-generating significant public

discussion.  In fall 2005, Bouterse led a series of

ineffectual political street protests demanding the

government step down. (See ref E).  Since then, Bouterse’s

NDP party has conducted a concerted and aggressive campaign

to undermine the fragile majority of the governing

coalitions, force new elections and form a government. (See

ref F).  In the context of the upcoming December murder

trial, these actions are likely an extension of Bouterse’s

suspected efforts to create a critical mass of unrest and

instability in order to force the government to end his

criminal trial.

 

Some observers portray Bouterse as a spent force, however,

who would be unable to muster enough domestic support to

create the level of unrest required to end the trial.

There are also indications of splits within Bouterse’s NDP

(See ref G). These observations combined with reported cash

flow problems may explain Bouterse’s reported outreach to

Khan for support.

 

A few months ago, Bouterse asserted that President Ronald

Venetiaan’s nephew and head of Suriname’s intelligence

services (CIVD) Col. Johan Ceder was involved in arms-for-

drugs trade with Brazilian criminal organizations.

However, in this small society with its large informal

sector, drug trafficking and money laundering, it is not

far fetched to think that there may be a kernel of truth at

root of smear campaign.

 

According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has put out the

word in an NDP neighborhood that former Minister of Trade

and Industry Siegfried Gilds had brought Khan into the

country to assassinate the Minister of Justice and Police

and Attorney General.  Gilds is under investigation for

money laundering.  The Attorney General categorically

dismissed this possibility.  For Bouterse, such a

disinformation campaign serves to shift the blame and

distance himself from Khan, while settling old political

scores against the man who removed him as head of the armed

forces in the early 1990’s.

 

If the GOS hands over Khan to the US, Bouterse may try to

garner support by portraying the current government as a

puppet of the US.  This plan is less than likely to occur,

however, as public opinion for the most part supports a

Khan departure from Su riname and would backfire for

Bouterse.

 

6.  (C)  HOW CAPABLE ARE THE SURINAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE

TO QUARANTINE ANY DISTURBANCES?  HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES

BOUTERSE HAVE ON SURINAME’S MILITARY AND POLICE?

 

The police are capable of containing disturbances of short-

term duration and minimal scope within Paramaribo city

limits.  However, any large-scale disturbance involving

simultaneous events around the city would likely spin out

of control, with even those not aligned with Bouterse

taking advantage of the situation to loot and riot.  This

would necessitate military intervention, but it would take

significant time for police and military together to

restore order in a sustained disruption scenario.  There is

also a history of political arson in Suriname, which places

Paramaribo’s many historic downtown wooden structures at

risk.  For events taking place outside the city, i.e. the

 

interior, police would be unable to handle a disturbance of

any significance and require immediate military assistance.

 

It is highly questionable whether the CIVD would play a

constructive role in quelling a disturbance.   The CIVD has

nominal responsibility for national security but is in fact

used primarily for domestic political intelligence, and it

is comprised of thugs and shady characters with ambiguous

loyalties.  That officers in the CIVD serve as a protective

force for senior GOS officials is disquieting.

 

The President and his cabinet have a habit of slow,

uncoordinated public reaction to adverse events, signaling

that in the midst of a significant disturbance, there could

be a security vacuum as the populace vainly looks towards a

plodding government for reassurance that order will be

restored.

 

Bouterse still appears to have a degree of support in the

military, but it is difficult to measure.  A group of

roughly 10 lower ranking persons in uniform attended a

Bouterse led NDP rally in late 2005 to show their support.

The Commander of the Armed Forces was reportedly extremely

angry at this, as members of the military members are

restricted from political involvement while in uniform; the

commander handed down subsequent disciplinary actions.  In

2004 a Bouterse crony, LTC Hans Jannasch, was sentenced to

eight years in prison by a Surinamese judge for running an

ecstasy lab; Jannasch was still on the military payroll at

the time, but was not active.   According to the commander

of the land forces, senior officers are always vigilant and

watchful for the potential for growing support for

Bouterse.

 

Bouterse has little direct influence within the Surinamese

police force, but his past as a two-time military coup

leader and his alleged links to organized crime still

intimidate police, who would plan any operations against

him with utmost care.

 

French police have recently trained the police Arrest Team

on making arrest under difficult circumstances in

preparation for a possible Bouterse arrest.  Police and

military are currently conducting joint training exercises

in preparation for the December murder trial.  The head of

the Military Police recently requested US military police

protective service training in August to train a 40-60

person military police force assigned to conduct security

for the trial.

 

 

7.  (S)  WHAT IS BOUTERSE’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RULING

PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY (PPP) IN GUYANA?  IS THE PPP

SUPPORTING BOUTERSE’S EFFORTS?

 

Post is not aware of any significant links between Bouterse

and the PPP, but there have been past connections between

Bouterse and the Guyanese opposition PNCR.  Despite both

being in the opposition at the time, in June 2004

Bouterse’s NDP party and the PNCR signed a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) calling for a urgent and peaceful

resolution to the border dispute between Guyana and

Suriname. According to PNCR leader Robert Corbin, the

signing was at the initiative of Bouterse. MOU discussions

took place in Georgetown and in Nickerie in western

Suriname.

 

8.  (S)  WILL EITHER GUYANA OR VENEZUELA GRANT BOUTERSE

ASYLUM OR PROVIDE HIM WITH OTHER SUPPORT?  IF SO, WHY WOULD

THEY DO SO?

 

Post defers to Georgetown and Caracas.

 

9.  (S)  DOES BOUTERSE HAVE TIES TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS

THAT MAY CONSIDER OFFERING HIM ASYLUM OR OTHER SUPPORT?

 

It is unlikely that Bouterse would receive asylum from

other governments.  However, Dutch Embassy contacts

maintain that Bouterse owns isolated property in northern

Brazil that could be a possible hideaway.

 

10.  (C)  WHAT IS KHAN’S ABILITY TO HELP DESTABILIZE THE

GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE ELECTIONS?

 

Post defers to Embassy Georgetown.

 

11.  (S/NF)  IS THERE EVIDENCE, BEYOND POSSIBLE CONJECTURE,

THAT KHAN ENJOYS SOME LEVEL OF POLITICAL PROTECTION FROM

SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND, IF SO,

FROM WHOM?

 

Post defers to Embassy Georgetown.

 

12.  (S/NF)  WHAT ARE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT’S OPTIONS AND

CAPABILITIES, ASSUMING THERE IS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO

SO, FOR, AT A MINIMUM, CONTAINING KHAN AND HIS ACTIVITIES

OR, AT BEST, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING HIM?

 

Post defers to Embassy Georgetown.

 

BARNES

 

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